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SE-IULTANEOUS ESTIMATION OF THE SUPPLY AM)
DEMAND FOR HOUSEHOLD LOCATION IN A
MULTIZONED METROPOLITAN AREA
Katharine Bradbury, Robert Engle, Owen Irvine, and Jerome Rothenberg
I. Introduction
This paper reports on work-in-progress of a research project designed
to model the growth and internal composition of the Boston metropolitan
area, and the location of household and business activities within the
area. The overall model is an interlocking system of three submodels:
1) a "macro" model, determining the level and composition of economic
activities in the area; 2) a household allocation model, determining the
spatial distribution of the household population and housing unit supply
over the area; 3) a business allocation model, determining the spatial
distribution of the business activity over the area.
The purpose for which this model is designed is policy analysis.
Changes in the many policy variables in the model will lead to redistribu-
tions of economic activity within the metropolitan area and changes in
growth patterns of the region. Comparison of alternative scenarios provides
the information upon which policy judgements can be made. In order to
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satlsfy this objective, it is important to formulate a behavioral model
which incorporates a rich choice of meaningful policy alternatives.
Each of the three submodels incorporates its own set of policy issues,
which can be examined in isolation. This paper will present preliminary
results only for the housing location submodel, but results from other
submodels are described in [5], [6], [7], [8]. Because this is only a
first stage in our efforts to formulate and estimate the complex relation-
ships determining household location, we will not focus on the policy
implications of our estimates. Instead, we report the present findings
to give an indication of the promise that our special approach seems to
hold and a suggestion as to how policy variables will influence the spatial
character of the metropolitan area.
The formulation of our behavioral model is based on three propositions
about special characteristics of urban housing markets.
1) Urban housing is an extremely durable good which is spatially fixed,
Therefore, the distribution of accommodations at a point in time will
extend its influence into a distant future, and public policy can only
gradually affect the spatial distribution of the stock of housing. A
corollary to this proposition is that supply responses take two distinct
forms: a) construction of new units, and b) conversion, retirement and
demolition of existing units. Since conversion responses can occur at
any time, and since they influence the profitability or desirability of
the units, they are likely to be decided upon by owners on a continuing
basis. Substantial modifications are therefore possible to the entire
housing stock, making this conversion mode of supply response potentially
very important in describing neighborhood evolution.
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2) Housing is a package of elements, comprising not only structural
features, but also land, neighborhood characteristics, local public services,
and accessibility to desirable destinations within and outside the urban
area. Decisions by economic agents, whether owners, landlords, neighbors,
developers or local government, only affect components of the overall housing
package.
3) Differences within each of these types of component and across
components matter significantly to households, and households differ in
their tastes for various configurations of these components. Changes in
the attributes of the housing package will therefore have differing impacts
on attracting the spectrum of household types.
The overall approach to translating these special features into a
model of metropolitan household location will be described in Section II.
Section III presents the theoretical concepts and estimates of the demand
equations. The theoretical issues and estimates of the supply equations
are discussed in Section IV.
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II. The Approach
Many approaches have been used to model metropolitan household loca-
tion. Early models based on gravity concepts of attraction between economic
units proved unable to characterize the important behavioral balance be-
tween attraction and increasing costs as more agents desire the same loca-
tion. More recently, large simulation models have been formulated [4],
[11], which estimate some parameters of the model econometrically and then
impose rather arbitrary market adjustment, supply response or locational
choice algorithms to close the system for simulation. Somewhat simpler
models based on the equilibrium assumptions underlying the bid rent model
[14], [10], estimate closed systems for demand behavior but do not integrate
this with supply and have some unattractive features such as no vacancy
rates.
Our approach is to formulate a model which can be estimated econo-
metrically from observed aggregate data. The model is based on behavioral
assumptions which are appropriate and often testable for economic agents.
In order to gain the luxury of estimates of all the parameters of demand
functions, supply responses and market adjustment functions, some simplifica-
tions must be made. We feel that the simplifications do not impair the
validity of the approach, and we present our preliminary estimates as
evidence of its promise.
We model a demand for housing acconmodation and a supply of such
accommodation. Our critical focus is on the spatial distribution of housing,
so the chief dimension of both demand and supply is the location of each
accommodation. We have divided the Boston metropolitan area into 89
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zones: Boston itself divided into 14 Boston Redevelopment Authority dis-
tricts plus 75 surrounding cities and towns.
The location of any particular accommodation specifies many components
of the housing package. For demanders the dimensions of a location which
are important include the average types of structural units available, the
physical environment of the zone, the demographic character of the neighbor-
hood, the character of local shopping facilities, the variety and quality
and cost of public services available (like parks, schools, health and
sanitation services, streets, and tax rates), and the accessibility to
desirable destinations in the rest of the SMSA. For suppliers the location
suggests prospects for revenues from supplying additional units of different
types through prices and vacancy rates, and various factors entering into
the cost of supplying them, such as vacant land, zoning constraints, sewer
systems, and stocks available for conversion.
The selection of political jurisdictions to represent location zones
is important. We aggregate to, but not beyond, the political jurisdiction
level both because of data availability and because we believe the public
service-tax component of the location dimension is especially important to
both demand and supply sides. In addition, code and zoning regulations
stem from the local governments and exercise significant constraints on
housing supply options. The descriptive and theoretical literature suggests
that fiscal federalism operates by self-selection of common-minded land-
users and their control of governmental instruments to cater to their
common interests while excluding disparate groups. This self-selection
process should impart a greater degree of homogeneity to land-use patterns
within each political jurisdiction than would be expected on the basis of
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nonpolitical factors alone. Thus, the jurisdiction may furnish a tolerable
degree of situational homogeneity to serve as the observational unit. Clearly,
large cities and towns will be less homogeneous; and our segmentation of
Boston is a recognition of this.
The demand for housing over these zones is traced in terms of three
types of housing occupancy, occupancy by low, middle and high income family
households. These categories of demand serve to allocate the urban popula-
tion over space in a partition of that population which is not only interesting
in itself because of its relevance to many socio-economic problems and
public policy issues, but is a form that can be determined within our macro
submodel. That submodel determines a household income distribution for the
metropolitan area as a whole and thus provides a direct input into this
household allocation submodel.
These household groups are seen as competitors for the scarce resources
of housing accommodations. Presumably all groups would prefer to locate in
attractive zones with good public services and high accessibilities.
However, because these zones have limited numbers of accommodations heavy
competition for these accommodations tend to raise the price of these units
high enough to restrict demand to be no greater than the number of units
available (while allowing for a vacancy rate that reflects normal turnover
of households among units) . The aggregate demand curve is the sum of the
different household group demand curves.
If the price in a zone rises to ration relatively heavy demand, there
will be incentives to suppliers to produce new units there either by new
construction or by conversion of old units to new functions. The supply
response is articulated both by mode - conversion or new construction -
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and by structure type - single family units, units in multiunit structures
(2 to 4 units per structure) , and units in apartment structures (more than
5 per structure). This breakdown is useful, because new construction
technology differs along these lines, and the relative ease or difficulty
of structural conversion of existing units is most probably linked to the
single-multi-apartment sequence.
The geographic partition of demand and supply in effect treats the
market for housing accommodations in each zone as a separate housing sub-
market. Various households demand units based in part upon the structural
characteristics of the zone's average housing package and in part on a host
of other zonal attributes, and the suppliers produce different quantities
of units of differing structural type depending on the revenues and costs
of supply in that zone both in absolute terms and relative to others. The
difference between aggregate demand and aggregate supply for accommodations
in a zone is the number of vacant units.
Each zone "clears" its housing market by a combination of price adjust-
ment and quantity adjustment. We employ a vacancy rate to supplement price
as a reflection of the market's current state. In a market characterized
by durability, moving costs, and lumpy consumption (one unit per household),
price does not adjust rapidly or far enough to clear the market in a reason-
ably short time. The market's immediate and moderate term response to
excess demand is registered partly by movements in the vacancy rate. For
example, in a tight market, price may not rise far enough to choke off suffi-
cient demand to clear the market (inclusive of a "normal" vacancy rate)
.
Alternatively, in periods of slack demand price may not fall far enough to
clear the market; then vacancy rates will rise above normal levels.
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Vacancy rates supplement prices in influencing the behavior of de-
manders and suppliers. The higher the vacancy rate in a zone, the less
search is necessary for a demander to find a suitable unit. High search
costs discourage demand as do high zonal prices. For suppliers vacancy
rates play two roles in defining expected revenues from additional units
in different zones: 1) one minus the vacancy rate reflects the probability
that an additional unit in the zone will be sold or rented; 2) it points
to future adjustments of price within that zonal market.
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III, Housing Demand
A. Theoretical Foundations
We perceive the household choice to be the selection of a housing
package designated by its zonal location. The package consists of a vector
of housing structure and land characteristics, social environmental com-
ponents, public sector characteristics of the zone, and potential *
* "Potential" rather than "actual" because different households work at
different destinations in the SMSA and thus have different actual acces-
sibilities from a common origin.
accessibility from the zone to probable desirable destinations in the SMSA.
It is important to note that households do not deal directly in the land
market: they demand housing accommodations not land.
The structural and land characteristics of a zone's housing package
are described in terms of average or representative units. Variables such
as the percentage of the units in a zone which are large, or old, or with
luxury plumbing, or in apartment buildings describe the distribution of
units. Similarly, the population density suggests the typical amount of
land input per unit. These summary measures of course fail to capture the
entire distribution of actual occupancies; for example, small houses exist
in neighborhoods which have mostly large units, leading to some demand in a
zone by household types who prefer small units. Although these observations
should average out for large groups of individuals, they may of course be
responsible for some noise in the estimates. However, in general, it will
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be true, for example, that high income families will demand accommodation
in zones which have a relatively high percentage of luxurious units.
A second class of components refers to the social environment of the
zone - the nature of the population and the character of their zonal
occupancy. We characterize the former by the percent of the zonal population
which is nonwhite, and the percentage on welfare; the latter by the residential
population density (population per acre). Another variable, the crime
rate, refers partly to the social environment and partly to the local
public sector's activity.
The third class of components, local public sector activity, is re-
flected by the pupil-teacher ratio in the school systems and the effective
real estate tax rate. It is through these variables that local public
policy has its primary effect on the demand for housing.
The fourth class of components of the housing package refers to acces-
sibility. We define the accessibility of a zone to be inversely related
to the anticipated real cost devoted to travel by residents of that zone.
For each zone the expected real cost to alternative destinations depends
upon the location of the destination and the nature of the transportation
network. Different household types have different destinations and different
modal choices. This is complicated by the facts that the identity of
each zone's inhabitants is not determined until after the locational choice
has been made, and that some systematic forms of self-selection occur.
So the pattern and real cost of trips is a probabilistic matter. In order
to capture some sense of this complexity we have, accordingly, constructed
a number of accessibility indices: a general job accessibility index by
income class in which destinations, their probable importance in relative
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frequency of trips, distances, and economic cost per trip, are integrated
in weighted form; an index of highway availability; and an index of transit
availability (not shown in the present results)
.
This vector of average structural, social environmental, public sector,
and accessibility components constitutes the zonal housing package. Housing
choices are influenced by the nature of these packages available in the
different zones, but not exclusively. These choices depend as well on the
income level of the household which, at one and the same time determines
the preferences for different housing package configurations and the de-
sirable tradeoffs between housing and nonhousing commodities. Finally,
accommodation choices depend on the prices of the different housing packages
available including the cost of finding a suitable unit. Thus in summary,
an array of different zonal housing packages is available to any household.
The packages differ in their attractiveness, partly depending on the income
class of the household. They differ also in prices, the sensitivity to
which also depends partly on income class. The household balances off
relative attractiveness with relative price, and selects the best compromise.
Income level is handled in our model in a way that illuminates our
prime interest in the spatial distribution of the population. Each demand
function is formulated as the determination of the share of each SMSA
family income class which is located in each zone. Since we partition
family households into high, middle and low income classes, we have a
separate zonal location demand function for each such class. An observation
involves using the set of attributes and price of a given zone (as ex-
planatory variables) to predict the percentage of each SMSA family income
class which will reside in that zone.
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Price has a special role to play in this formulation. Only because
prices differ from one zone to another can we understand the location
of the low income families in the most unattractive zones. A simple correla-
tion between the location of low income households and zonal attributes
would suggest that low income households love dilapidated housing. This
conclusion is however a "reduced form" result which indicates that once
the demand and supply equations are solved, which is the real world process
of competition for scarce attractive housing packages, low income groups
get what is left over, groups with more market power having already had
their pick.
In our structural model, the income group which finally locates in
a particular zone depends upon the trade-off between price, the zonal
search costs, and the attributes of the zonal housing package. Coefficients
on zonal attributes for the different household groups reflect relative
group preferences for the attribute combined with their relative willing-
ness to exchange money for preferred housing accommodations. It is this
differing pattern of coefficients across income classes which leads to that
critical characteristic of U.S. metropolitan areas, the sharp socio-economic
segmentation of residential neighborhoods and even political jurisdictions.
The specification of the demand for housing determines the number
of occupants as a function of market price and vacancy rate, as well as
attributes, as in many conventional Walrasian demand functions. The
attributes serve essentially to define the commodity and its quality,
and the vacancy rate serves as an aspect of the real price of the commodity
to the user
.
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To make clear the connection between our approach and a variety of
others, which we shall characterize as perfect market models, let us
denote the bid by group i for housing in a particular zone j as P..
This bid may differ from the market price. It will depend on the at-
tributes, X, of the zone through an implicit bid rent function specific
to the particular group:
This formulation makes it possible for different user groups to evaluate
the same attributes differently according to their own utility functions
and budget constraints.
Since each user will buy one and only one location, unlike the
conventional demand theory with multiple connnodities, this single locational
choice will be based on the competitive bidding of the different users
for the finite set of locations - the existing set of acconnnodations
available in the several zones at any time.
In a perfect market the highest bidding group will win the accommoda-
tions in each zone, and the winning bid will become the zone's market
price. If the actual number of accommodations in the zone exceeds the
number wanted by the highest bidding group, the remainder will go to
the next highest bidding group, and the market price will be the lower
price of the second highest bidding group that actually occupies some
of the zone's accommodations. If the actual number of units falls short
of the number desired by the highest bidding group, the excess of users
will settle in another zone or zones where they are either highest (or
second highest in excess accommodation zones). Shortage in the first
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zone will force the group to raise their whole set of bid prices in corapeti-
tion to allocate first and second choices among the group. Each set
of bid prices implies a different utility level for the group, the higher
the bid the lower the utility. All users are allocated to one zone or
another in this way. In any zone where they reside the zone's market
price will either equal or be less than their bid price.
From the above, the market price in a zone (supposing all accommoda-
tions to be homogeneous) depends on the number of accommodations available
relative to demands for them. The former depends on past and near-present
supply decisions. A zone which would have been first choice for a given
group if it had enough units available to keep price down, may drop to
second or lower choice with a smaller number of units that would have
raised price.
Thus, the demand function for a given group i can be given as a function
of both the group's bid and the zone's market price:
Number of occupants in zone j from group i = f(P., P.).
Then P. = P. for the occupying group in each zone. For that same
group P > P, in every other zone. Thus a perfect market would imply
that function f (in equation (b)) should be a step function: (1) for
P. = P., the whole group locates in i: (2) for P. > P., no member of the
2 2 2 2
group locates there. * In a perfect market, the long-run supply response
* There will be a few zones with multiple occupancy. As shown above, in
these zones the market price will be below the bid of the highest bidder
so f will not strictly be a step function.
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to different zones equalizes rates of return to suppliers, setting relative
numbers of units that influence household choices. Under certain condi-
tions (as when additional housing packages can be supplied at constant
costs *) each zone will be homogeneous with respect to users.
* The package includes density and other nonstructure zonal attributes,
Our treatment diverges somewhat from this treatment. Firsc, in
our model supply is taken as jointly determined with prices and demand,
but we do not assume that our observations reflect long-run supply equilib-
rium. Relative numbers of units available in the different zones do not
establish perfect user homogeneity. Thus, for any zone competition re-
sults in P. < P. for user groups. Second, we do not assume that all
J - J
users are in their long-run equilibriiim. High moving costs prevent users
from being in perfect adjustment to relative prices in the different
zones at every moment.
Third, we introduce vacancy rates as a market adjustment variable.
At any time a market clearing identity is fulfilled:
Number of units available in zone j = J^ (number of occupants
i
of group i) + vacant units.
As noted earlier in this paper, we assume that price does not adjust
rapidly to market changes, so vacancy rates represent a residual adjust-
ment and act therefore as an additional proxy with price of the current
state of the market; in addition they reflect the cost of search for
appropriate housing units in a zone and so are a genuine part of the
real price of housing in the zone.
Finally, our model deals with accommodations that are not uniform
in each zone but are varied. Members of different groups can find different
kinds of accommodation in the same zone.
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For all these reasons we estimate each group's demand function as
a continuous function of market price, vacancy rate and implicit bid
price - i.e., the g function of zonal attributes:
Number of occupants in zone i from group i = f*(P., VR., P.)
J J J
= f*(P^, VRj, g'-(Xj)).
B. Empirical Results
The demand by a particular household group for housing in a particular
zone depends upon the zonal housing package attributes, the cost of the
search necessary to find a suitable unit in the zone, and upon the price
level prevailing in the zone. It also depends, however, upon the prices,
search costs, and attributes of other zones which are close substitutes for
the zone. In general, the demand in any zone must depend upon all the
prices in all the zones, the costs of search in all the zones, and upon all
the housing package attributes available in all other zones. Unfortunately,
the strength of the cross-elasticities will vary endogenously . As a simple
first solution, the price, search costs, and the attributes of each zone
were taken relative to the SMSA average for that variable.
The price variable is designed to be the price per unit of a standard
accommodation in a zone. Using actual sales data, price indices for each
zone were constructed with a regression method described in Bailey, Muth
and Nourse [3] and illustrated with the same data in Engle [9]. This
method eliminates the need to identify the standard unit, but hinges on
the assumption that different types of units in a zone experience similar
rates of price change. Tests of this hypothesis were generally accepted.
Because this price series is an index, it is only possible to determine the
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rates of change of prices in different zones. The model is therefore
estimated in rate of change form. *
* There were some zones for which these indices could not be constructed.
Therefore the rates of change over the 60-70 decade were projected upon
the census rates of change of value and composition to obtain an approxima-
tion for the other zones.
The model as described above can be formalized by a series of demand
functions for each family income group:
(1) D^/D^ = D^CA^/A^, A^/A^, A^/A^, k*Ik" , P /P, V /V)
z zzzzz z
where D is the number of households of income y who demand location in
z
1 2
zone z, and a bar represents the SMSA average of this variable. A , A ,
3 4A , A are the vectors of attributes corresponding to structural and land
attributes, social environmental attributes, public service attributes
and accessibility attributes respectively, P is the zonal price, and V
z z
the initial zonal housing unit vacancy rate which is a measure of search
costs. Because the available price variable is an index of price changes,
the model was estimated in terms of decadal differences. A linear form was
chosen as a trial specification. Two stage least squares was used to
estimate the coefficients of these equations because of the simultaneous
nature of a number of the right hand variables. The change in price, the
change in all the structural attributes, the change in population density,
APOPDEN, the change in the percent nonwhite, ABLACK, and the change in
the percent of households on welfare, AWELFARE, were all treated as
endogenous variables.
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The estimated coefficients for the LOW, MIDDLE, and HIGH income family
household groups are shown in Table 1, with variable definitions in the
appendix.
All equations are estimated with 2SLS with indicated variables treated
as endogenous. The sample is the 89 zones of the Boston SMSA. Asymptotic
standard errors and other diagnostic information are presented for each
equation.
These preliminary results display encouraging consistency with theoretical
expectation. The a priori expectations for signs of the coefficients are
displayed in Table 1. In 80% of the cases, these are satisfied and in only
two cases are the a priori expectations rejected at the 95% level for a one
tailed asymptotic test. The coefficients themselves are elasticities:
A coefficient value of .5 in Table 1 means that if the zone were to increase
its relative supply of the attribute by 1.0%, the zone's share of that
income group would increase by .5%.
All three estimated coefficients in the change in price variable,
APRICE, were negative as economic theory would lead us to believe a priori .
The standard errors of this variable, however, were large, making the
confidence intervals wide. It is interesting to note that low income
families are much more sensitive to the price of the housing package than
either of the two higher income groups. This is reasonable, considering
that many households in this group are living in poverty. Another com-
plicating factor contributing to these results is that many of the two
upper income groups are homeowners rather than renters. A homeowner,
viewing his house as an investment as well as a consumption good, may de-
sire to purchase a unit in a zone where prices are rising rapidly, with
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Table 1
ESTIMATES OF HOUSEHOLD DEMAND EQUATIONS BY TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES t
AND ASYMPTOTIC STANDAilD ERRORS
(All variables are 1960 to 1970 changes in ratios to the SMSA mean except where noted)
A PRIORI
EXPECTED SIGN ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS (STANDARD ERRORS)
Low Middle High Low Middle High Type
APRICE _ _ _
VAC RATE +
60
ABATHROOMS
ALARGE
°^°60
APOPDEN
BLACK,
„oO
ABLACK
AWELFARE
CRIME tt
AEFFTAX
APTRATIO
AJOBACC_
AHIGHWAY
CONSTANT
r2
SSR
STD ERROR
t The instruments used with the endogenous variables were the exogenous variables
of the supply equations and the 1960 predetermined values of the endogenous
variables,
tt The 1970 level relative to the SMSA mean used because lacked 1960 data.
-.49
(.35)
-.20
(.26)
-.19
(.58)
endogenous
-.06
(.06)
.11*
(.04)
.24*
(.09)
exogenous
-.01
(.10)
.26*
(.08)
.74*
(.17)
endogenous
.02
(.19)
-.30*
(.15)
-.41
(.32)
endogenous
-.09
(.14)
-.20*
(.11)
-.62*
(.23)
exogenous
-.02
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
-.08
(.06)
endogenous
.05*
(.03)
-.05*
(.02)
-.09*
(.04)
exogenous
.08*
(.03)
-.06*
(.03)
-.14*
(.06)
endogenous
.05
(.06)
-.07*
(.04)
.04
(.09)
endogenous
-.04
(.04)
-.03
(.03)
-.17*
(.07)
exogenous
-.08
(.12)
-.02
(.09)
-.21
(.20)
exogenous
-.31*
(.12)
-.01
(.09)
-.07
(.20)
exogenous
-.47*
(.22)
.37*
(.16)
.27
(.38)
exogenous
-.002
(.07)
-.05
(.05)
-.23*
(.12)
exogenous
.63
(.33)
.37
(.25)
.83
(.55)
.39
2.13
.17
.50
1.24
.13
.52
5.87
.28
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a view to capturing future capital gains, rather than being deterred by
rapidly rising prices.
As discussed in Section II, each zonal housing market is viewed as
adjusting through both price and quantity variations in all but the very
long run. Excess zonal demands or supplies are registered by both zonal
price movements and by movements in the zonal vacancy rate. The beginning
of the decade zonal vacancy rate, VAC RATE,., was included in the demand
olj
equations. In the equations for HIGH and MIDDLE income families, the
estimated coefficients on VAC RATE-_ are positive as a priori economic
oU
theory concerning the costs of search would lead us to expect. These
coefficients are also statistically quite significant. Also they increase
in size from the LOW equation, which exhibits an insignificant negative
coefficient, through the HIGH equation's coefficient. This is consistent
with the higher opportunity costs of search for high income households.
Four structural attributes were utilized in these preliminary re-
gressions: the percent of a zone's units that are large units (> 7 rooms),
ALARGE, the percent of a zone's units that are over thirty years old, OLD,„,
the percent of a zone's units that have greater than one bathroom, ABATHROOMS,
and the population density, APOPDEN. The signs of the coefficients on
ABATHROOMS increase in size from the LOW to the HIGH income group equation
supporting the a priori expectation of a much stronger preference for more
luxurious larger units by higher income families. The elasticity coeffi-
cients on this variable, in addition to being large in absolute size,
are also statistically very significant, the elasticity coefficient of .74
being the most economically and statistically significant coefficient in
the HIGH income equation. The coefficients on OLD,^ all are negative, as
dU
the assumption that households prefer newer units, ceteris paribus, would
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lead us to expect a priori . These coefficients increase in absolute size
from the LOW income to the HIGH income equation, confirming the a priori
expectation that higher income households have a much stronger preference
for newer, more luxurious units. The elasticity coefficient estimates
on OLD,- in the equations for MIDDLE and HIGH are statistically quite
oO
significant in addition to being among the largest in absolute size.
Indeed, these variables characterizing the structural characteristics of
a zone's typical housing package play a very important role in these
estimated demand equations.
Population density also proved to be an important variable: all the
signs are negative as expected. The hypothesis that the higher the family's
income, the stronger its preference for low density also was supported
by the estimated coefficients which increase in absolute size from the LOW
to HIGH equation. This result reflects the preference of high income
families for space, a preference which partially explains the high income
suburban ring so common in U.S. metropolitan areas.
All four of the social environmental attributes were found to enter
one or more of the equations in a significant manner. The percent of
the households in a zone which were nonwhite was included to capture the
preferences of whites to live segregated from nonwhites. Both the be-
ginning of the decade zonal percent nonwhite, BLACK^^, and the change
oU
in the percent nonwhite, ABLACK (treated as endogenous), were included
in these demand equations. The estimated coefficients on both these vari-
ables turned out to be statistically significant in all three equations.
The signs on both these variables were positive for LOW income families,
partly reflecting the fact that a nontrivial portion of this group was
-22-
itself nonwhite, the majority of the nonwhite households in the Boston
S.M.S.A. being low-income households. * The signs of the estimated coefficients
* The dependent variables of these estimated equations contain households
of all races. Currently we are separating out the nonwhite households
in hopes of estimating separate income class demand equations for them,
and examining whether LOW income whites have similar preferences to the
HIGH and MIDDLE income groups in this regard, or are closer to the present
mixed LOW group.
of both of these variables are negative in both the MIDDLE and HIGH income
group equations, strongly confirming the preference for segregation by
Boston S.M.S.A. whites. Also the larger negative coefficients on both
the variables in the HIGH income equation implies that this segregation
preference is more intense among the higher income whites. It is note-
worthy that this segregation preference appears quite strongly even
controlling for the higher welfare population, the higher tax rates,
the poorer schools, and the higher crime rates often cited as reasons
for the flight by whites from integrated central city zones to the segregated
suburban communities.
Approximately 65.6% of the LOW income households were on welfare in
1970. Therefore it was expected that the coefficient on the percent of a
zone's households on welfare, AWELFARE, would be positive in the LOW equa-
tion. The estimated coefficients on welfare partially support the hypothesis
that the existence of a large welfare population in a zone constitutes a
"negative externality" to middle and high income families independent of
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the fiscal burden caused by their presence and independent of the crime
rate to which a large welfare population may contribute disproportionately.
A priori , all family households were expected to prefer low relative crime
rates. This was supported by the negatively signed coefficients on CRIME
obtained in all the estimated equations.
The local public service variables also proved significant. The importance
of the quality of the local public schools as part of the housing package
offered in a zone is supported by our results. All three estimated coeffi-
cients on the PTRATIO were negative as expected. In addition, all three
family groups also appear to be sensitive to the local effective tax rates
in the a priori expected manner. High-income families seem to be the most
sensitive to (or adept at avoiding) high relative tax rates.
A priori , it was felt that all income level households would prefer
more accessibility to less. The larger the relative value of the general
job, accessibility index, AJOBACC_, the less is the zone's accessibility.
Therefore a negatively signed coefficient was expected. Some urban econo-
mists have argued that the poor have the strongest preferences for acces-
sibility. However, the rich would seem to have the highest opportunity
cost to their time spent in commuting. Therefore the expected pattern of
the size of the coefficients on AJOBACC_ was uncertain. As can be seen from
Table 1, the large sized, statistically significant, negatively signed
estimated coefficient on AJOBACCL in the LOW equation indicates that low
income families do prefer locations that are highly accessible to their
jobs. The positive coefficients on AJOBACC_ in the MIDDLE and HIGH
equations suggest that these households are less averse to job travel
than we expected. We are investigating this further with improved acces-
sibility measures.
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The negatively signed estimated coefficients on the highway index in
all three equations indicate that the negative externalities generated by
highways crossing a zone are significant. These elasticities increase
monotonically in absolute size with the income level of the household as
would be expected a priori ; i.e., high-income families are the most sensitive
to the negative externalities generated by highways. The automobile is the
major source of pollution and congestion in the Boston SMSA; these results
suggest that all households are sensitive to the externalities it generates.
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rv. The Supply of Housing
Our model of housing supply focuses on the number of housing units
made available to households in a zone and their structure type (in terms
of units per structure) . The actors whose behavior is being modelled
are housing suppliers of two basic types: builders of new units and
owners of existing units. Conversion supply is treated on parity with new
construction, but with expectations that the determinants of the two will
differ to some extent.
Suppliers of housing presumably compare the present values of revenues
and costs when deciding upon a housing investment just as would an investor
in any enterprise. The quantity and type of housing forthcoming in any
zone in a particular period will be related to the costs and revenues of
producing these units at the particular location. A careful analysis of
these costs and revenues for different structure types and modes of supply
provides the structural model behind the supply equations.
The decision to supply a unit of housing is a decision to combine
factors of production, such as capital, labor, land, and possibly an existing
structure which can be converted, to produce a new unit. The amount of
housing which is produced in a zone will therefore depend upon the price
and possibly the quantity of the factors which are available in the zone,
and the final selling price of housing. Because capital and labor are
equally available at all zones in an SMSA and approximately at the same
price (except perhaps for the availability of credit to the ghetto) , the
major differences across zones will be in the land and convertible structure
factors, and in output prices.
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We begin our exposition of the housing supply model with a discussion
of new construction and how the land market interacts with new supply
decisions. Then the determination of structure type of new units is
analyzed. Finally, a model of conversion supply is proposed and estimated.
This separate treatment should not obliterate the fact that these sources
and types of housing supply interact and compete in and across all zones,
both in the input markets and in the housing market as a whole, where
consumers are faced with the full array of sources and types of units.
A. New Construction
The most important input price variation for producers of new housing
units in a metropolitan area is the price of land. The locational variation
in the price of land is the central focus of much urban land use literature
and is important in this housing supply model as well. William Alonso
[1], [2] and others (Richard Muth, Edwin Mills, Lowdon Wingo) have developed
models in which competition among different kinds of users for scarce urban
land determines the price of land in each location and allocation of land
among user types. Starting from the assumption that the only differences
in the marginal revenue productivity of different locations in an urban
area are due to distance to a central market, whose proximity is valued
differently by different users, the models predict concentric rings of
land devoted to different urban uses, and declining densities of any
use as distance from the center increases.
But metropolitan development does not take place literally as these
land use models depict, with all land in a given annulus used up (at
varying densities) before the next annulus is bid away from the (given
base price) agricultural use. In fact, we observe parcels of undeveloped
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vacant land at all distances from the "center", and the percent vacant
varies in a systematic way, increasing with distance from the center.
The price of this vacant land, other than at the very edge of the urban
area is certainly not zero (or some constant agricultural price) . The
price reflects the price of comparable (in a location sense) developed
land, and hence relates to alternative uses to which a lot could be put.
To understand the existence of vacant parcels in any annulus within
the urban area, we must assume that some of the demand (for the fixed
amount of land in the annulus) is by demanders who choose not to develop
the land to whatever its most profitable current use is. Vacant land
yields no revenue in the present, and in fact is liable to taxes, yet
buyers hold it vacant. These buyers are willing to pay as much as producers
who turn it to revenue-yielding purposes (or if they already hold it vacant,
they are willing to resist such bids by producers). It must be that they
expect other returns. Specifically, holders of vacant land speculate
on rising land values. When these speculators choose to "cash in" their
capital gains, they can be seen as suppliers of vacant land to producers
of housing or nonresidential services. If speculators' reservation
prices (below which they wish to hold land vacant) are distributed randomly
(perhaps because of risk preferences and expectations), then the land
supply curve has its usual upward slope: the lower the market price, the
larger the number of speculators whose reservation price is not exceeded,
hence who hold land. Taxes on land value will reinforce this slope, since
they increase carrying costs of holding land vacant as its price rises.
As demand by other land users in the annulus grows, the opportunity
cost of holding land vacant is higher, and hence less of it is held.
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"Other" demand for land is derived from business use, use by the public
sector and other institutions, and residential land use. We expect this
derived demand for land in any one location (or annulus) to be quite price-
elastic, since close substitutes (nearby parcels) exist. Thus demanders
arbitrage across land markets to keep prices in line with marginal revenue
productivity (which depends on "accessibility" in the eyes of the highest
bidder). One thus observes the pattern of land prices and land use densities
predicted by land use models - declining from the center - and in addition
observes increasing shares of vacant land as one moves from the center.
As population and/or income in an urban area grow over time, the derived
demand for land in all uses increases, and vacant land at each location
within the urban area declines at the same time as more land is absorbed
into the urban fringes; the metropolitan area develops up and out, inten-
sively and extensively, simultaneously.
In the context of this housing supply model, each "location" to which
the analysis is applied is a city or town or district with fixed total
land area. In each zone, speculators are assumed to behave in the same
way, "supplying" increasing fractions of the total land to other uses as
demand (hence price) increases. Thus a relation making the price of
land a decreasing function of share of land vacant is assumed to hold
across towns. This assumption does not imply that holders of vacant land
control the price of land, for in fact the price is the outcome of inter-
action among all land users in the market for land. Rather, this specula-
tive model is chosen as a useful way to look at "land supply" to housing
producers and others. Similar stories can be told for subdivision of
occupied lots, reclamation of marginal acreage and many other forms of land
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supply. The outcome of this approach is that the percent of vacant land is
a good indicator of the price of land.
Other inputs into new housing production may be limited for the whole
urban area, but each zone is a small part of that area and hence suppliers
can be considered to perceive these inputs as perfectly elastically supplied.
We model new housing as produced by a competitive industry with a
constant returns to scale production function, (1) Q = Q(L,N); where Q
is total housing units produced and L and N the amount of land and nonland
inputs, respectively. This production function implies a relationship
between output price and factor prices, (2) p = p(r,n); where r and n
are the price of land and nonland inputs, respectively, and p is the
price of a unit of housing.
If the elasticity of substitution between land and nonland inputs
in the production of housing is not zero, producers will use less land
and more nonland inputs to produce a unit of housing where land price
is higher. Thus the land input per housing unit is a function of the price
of land (or really the factor price ratio)
:
(3) L/Q = m = m(r/n) or L = m(r/n)*Q
where L is total land used by housing suppliers, hence m is the land
per unit, or lot size.
The previous section developed the proposition that the price of
land can be expressed as a function of the fraction "developed", i.e..
(4) r = r(V/T) = r(v) = r((T-L-J)/T)
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where T is total land area in a town; L, as above, the land used in new
housing production, J the other "already-developed" land area, and V
the amount vacant, and v = V/T. For simplicity this function is often
assumed to have a constant elasticity.
If all these functions are well-behaved, then we can derive from (2),
(3) and (4) a "supply function" for housing in each town which relates
quantity produced to output price, incorporating the effect of land devel-
opment on the factor input price:
(5) p = f(Q/T) or Q/T = s(p) = f"^(p)
The Q/T can be thought of as gross residential density, or more simply
as a quantity of output along a supply curve which has been standardized
for the size of city or town. The price of land rises as more land in
a town is developed. For the housing new construction industry, this rising
factor supply schedule causes supply to be an increasing function of
price, in spite of constant returns to scale in production.
The shape of this supply curve depends crucially upon two of the under-
lying relationships - how responsive lot size (and hence total derived
demand for land at any output level) is to changes in the price of land,
and how responsive the price of land is to changes in the quantity developed
(or demanded by housing producers)
.
Taking percentage derivatives of supply equation (5) at a point, we
derive a relation between output prices and quantities given by Muth [13,
p. 228]:
dfi . /V^^ d£M \ / ^
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where Ic and k are the factor shares, e is the price elasticity of
land supply, a is the elasticity of substitution between the factors of
production, and the prices of nonland inputs are held constant. If a = 1,
the factor shares are constant, and the price elasticity of housing supply
varies with the price elasticity of the supply of land to new construction.
The speculative model of vacant land release suggests that the price
elasticity of residential land supply is greater where there is more vacant
land. Thus we would expect housing to be more elastically supplied in
the suburbs than in dense central city areas. Our econometric specifica-
tion must recognize this variation in elasticity across the metropolitan
area.
If a is less than unity, * the factor shares are a function of
* Muth offers support for this hypothesis in [12], pp. 82-83 and p. 315.
factor prices, and land's share in housing will be greater in the city
center than in the suburban fringe of a metropolitan area where land is
less expensive. Thus in the non-Cobb-Douglas case, equation (6) implies
a second factor contributing to the higher price elasticity of housing
supply in the less-developed areas of the metropolitan region. The effect
of the smaller price elasticity of land supply is augmented by the greater
sensitivity of output price to land price (higher land share) in producing
a lower price elasticity of housing supply in more central parts of the
urban area.
There is an additional element varying across zones which directly
affects the new housing production function. The amount of land in other
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uses, just like the amount of land consumed by housing producers, affects
the price and elasticity of supply of land. Housing producers in a town
with increasing "other land use" face higher land prices, ceteris paribus,
according to (A) . Thus we need to include in (6) a term reflecting any
shifts in the supply of land curve during the decade. (Differing initial
conditions are captured by the initial supply elasticity of land.) The
appropriate form for this equation is also derived by Muth [13] and is
dQ ^ h''^^ d£ dj
^^ Q kj^ p L,J J
where e^ . is the elasticity of supply of L with respect to J (other land
use), and dJ/J the percent change in J. The greater the increase in other
land use, the less land there is available to housing producers, hence
the less housing production, ceteris paribus . When we assume a constant
elasticity in (4) the second term in (7) simplifies to dJ/L.
In addition to these production function and input market influences,
there are other factors Impinging on new construction housing supply in
a metropolitan area. Because of the lags which characterize housing
market price and quantity adjustments and the integer character of purchases
or leases (one household to one housing unit) , vacancy rates are an im-
portant adjustment mechanism in equating supply and demand for housing.
Thus builders of new units can be expected to use vacancy rate changes
as indicators of the direction of future price movements. Since occupancy
rates are almost never one hundred percent, they also indicate the probability
of actually selling or leasing a unit when it is made available on the
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market. Both of these points suggest that when vacancy rates are high
or rising, producers will be discouraged from adding to the housing stock.
Within the separate jurisdictions of a metropolitan area, there are
also important government interventions into the operations of the housing
"market". Cities and towns in a metropolitan area have various zoning
policy tools at their disposal to try to control or direct the residential
and nonresidential development of the jurisdiction. Municipalities can
zone limited areas for business and commercial use, set up residential sub-
areas with differing maximum density limits (height, frontage, lot size),
and grant or withhold variances to the rules they establish. Such regula-
tions may simply cause producers to put units they would have built anyway
into spatially contiguous homogeneous sub-areas, or they may actually
restrict the kind of housing production which occurs in the zone. If
producers are restricted from using the land per unit ratio they would
otherwise choose, their profits are reduced, and one would expect less housing
production. Minimum lot size zoning regulations, for example, when binding,
reduce the effective land available to producers.
We derive from (6) and the additional factors discussed above, a
supply equation for new construction to be estimated econometrically.
It takes the form
/ON dQ ^ ,^, . dp. ^ ,dJ- ^ ,d_VACRATE. , ,^^^„. ,
(8) ^ = ^0 -^ ^1^^^^^ p> ^ ^2^~I} ^ ^^ VAC RATE^ "^ a^(OPEN) + e
,-^ TJT j^jji. d VAC RATE ^where Q, v, p, J, and L are defined above,
—vAr~RATP percentage
change in the housing unit vacancy rate, and OPEN is the fraction of land
in the town which is both vacant and not restricted to minimum lot sizes
-34-
greater than 25,000 square feet. The function f represents the relation-
ship between percent land vacant and the parameters discussed earlier
which enter the price elasticity term: the elasticity of substitution,
the factor shares, and the elasticity of land supply. Although we know
that f (v) is an increasing function we do not know its exact functional
form. For simplicity we assume that f depends on the ratio of vacant
land to residential land at the beginning of the period. Therefore we
expect a to be positive, a and a to be negative, and a positive.
The supply relation was estimated using decadal percentage changes
in the number of housing units in a cross-section of 89 Boston metropolitan
area sub-regions. The equation is estimated with 2SLS treating prices
and vacancy rates as endogenous. The instruments are taken from the
demand equation. Because the equation is nonlinear in the variables,
nonlinear functions of the exogenous variables are also valid instruments
and several of these are used.
The estimated equation with asymptotic standard errors is given below.
The exact definitions of the variables are given in the appendix.
.„.T, rn^r^AT -,,>, r^rr-, VACANT ACRES,
^
NEW TOTAL
_
.104
-0651^ 60_
TOTAL^^ (.0286) (.0119) ^^RESIDENTIAL ACRES, ^'^
oO bU
.171
^
. AOTHER ACRES .
_
.144 ^ A (VAC RATE) .271
^pfm +
(.121) ^RESIDENTIAL ACRES^^"' (.0377) VAC RATE.„ (.109)
^
oU oU
Standard error of the regression = .135
F-statistic (4.84) = 14.3
The overall fit of the equation is reasonable and the individual coefficients
have small standard errors and a priori sign expectations. In particular,
the t-ratios on the price elasticity and the vacancy rate are quite large.
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These estimates imply price elasticities of new housing supply from
.55 In the open suburbs to almost zero (.0006) in the dense center city.
In addition, new housing will be forthcoming as vacancy rates are decreased
so the net response due to changing demand conditions will be felt through
both price and quantity measures. Alternative land uses do appear to
compete strongly for land and will act to discourage new supply. The availa-
bility of vacant land which does not face zoning restrictions will lead to
new construction.
B. New Construction Structure Types
Having proposed and estimated a model of new construction supply
of housing units for geographic zones in a metropolitan area, we turn now
to a careful examination of one characteristic of new housing units so
produced, their structure type. When the price of land is higher (across
zones or over time within a zone) , a housing unit is produced with less
land relative to other inputs to economize on the more expensive factor.
This factor substitution is expected whether we think there are different
technologies for different structure types (and each structure type is
built where its technology is most profitable) , or one technology for
different structure types, as long as the one technology has a nonzero
elasticity of substitution. If there are different technologies, but
one output in the eyes of the consumers, then one technology will be most
profitable with given input prices, and the situation is much the same
as under the assumption of one technology, except that there may be kinks
or discontinuities in the supply function. Equation (3) of the last
section implies that for any given land price, the land per unit (lot size)
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of new construction is uniquely determined, decreasing as land price in-
creases. If we could define structure types in terms of a range of land/
nonland input ratios, given any input price ratio, we would know the
structure type of all new construction. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
However, when we actually observe the structure types of new construc-
tion in different zones in the metropolitan area, we do not see such
unanimity as to the appropriate structure type within each zone. Within
the theoretical context of this model, there are several reasons for this
lack of uniformity.
First of all, our "observations" are for an entire decade of new
construction responses. The model suggests that over that time span, it
might well be that residential and other development could cause the price
of land to cross a threshold between types, thus making appropriate at
least two structure type responses within a town when the decade is taken
as a whole.
Second, cities, towns and districts are not entirely internally
homogeneous areas, although we treat them as such in the model. We argue
that there is more internal homogeneity than similarities across towns.
However, neighborhood attributes affect land prices within towns as well,
but with a lesser degree of variation. In using these zones as our unit
of observation, we have abstracted from this internal heterogeneity,
lines between jurisdictions, we may expect some "smearing" near the edges
of jurisdictions. If one town's "appropriate" type is singles, and its
neighbor's is multi-family units, we may see some overlap at the border.
Third, historical and institutional restrictions interfere with the
price of land's deterministic effect on structure type. Zoning, neighbor-
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hood effects, and the timing of release of land parcels and their size
(whether through demolition, lot splitting, or vacant land sales) may make
only one structure type possible on a given lot, even though, given full
flexibility, a producer would combine land and other inputs in different
proportions.
Finally, there is a measurement or definition problem. The production
function implies that the land-nonland ratio responds as a continuous
function of the price of land (as depicted in Figure 1); that is, lot size
decreases as the price of land increases. What we measure with our census
data on structure types (single, multi-family defined as two-to-four units
in the structure, and apartments with five or more units per structure)
only corresponds very crudely to a measure of land per unit or land to
nonland input ratio. A single family unit on a small lot might have less
land per unit than a large lot duplex or even a low-rise "garden apartment"
complex. Thus we may classify units in the wrong segment of the continuum.
Taking all these effects into account, we still expect the price
of land to be a good predictor of structure type. However, rather than
an on-off switch between structure types, the relationship between structure
type shares of new construction and land price is expected to be smoother,
since all the factors discussed above contribute to heterogeneity of
types, given land price.
Local government actions such as zoning and provision of sewers can
also affect the structure type built by the producer. The availability of
sewer lines has been used explicitly by local governments to control develop-
ment in some areas around Washington, D.C.. It may or may not be cheaper
to build any housing unit where sewers are available, because the cost of
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internal sewage treatment systems (septic tank) need not be included by the
builder, but connections to the sewer system must be built. However, high-
rise structures cannot be serviced by septic tanks. Thus sewer avail-
ability has a role to play in determining the technological feasibility of
different structure types.
Zoning, cited above as one of the interferences between land price and
structure type, is a local government policy tool the impact of which can
be modelled more explicitly. Zoning regulations generally restrict housing
producers' choices in an asymetric fashion; that is, they set a maximum
(e.g., unit per land area density or height) and allow any uses which do
not exceed the maximum. We want to model two such types of zoning regu-
lations. One variable is a zero-one dummy for whether the town zoning code
allows apartment structures at all. If apartments are not allowed, the
apartment share of new construction is expected to be zero. Thus this
variable is included by multiplying it (A = when apartments are banned)
by all the right-hand variables in the apartment share equation. The
second type of zoning is the establishment of lot size minimums for part or
all of the residential (and vacant) area of a town. The minimum lot size
zoning variable measures the percent of the town which is restricted to lot
sizes greater than 25,000 square feet. Where this minimum lot size ap-
plies, any units built must be single unit structures (surrounded by over
half an acre of land). Thus if a town's residential and vacant land is all
so zoned, all units built will be singles. If a town has no zoning, the
price of land and sewer availability will determine the shares of total new
construction which are of each structure type. If minimums apply in part
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of a town, singles will be built in that part and land price and sewers
will determine what is built in the unzoned areas.
Thus, if in the absence of zoning the model were:
NEW SINGLE ., -
_^ u^ctttttton ^
NEW TOTAL = ^^^> + h
(SEWER) + e
^^ tlt^^ = A*g(r) + A*k(SEWER) + eNEW TOTAL ^
(where r is the price of land, A is the apartment banned dummy variable,
and f
, g, h, and k are functions) , then the model including zoning should
be
^ ^qS^ = ^^ "^ UZ*f (r) + UZ*h(SEWER) + £
NEW APART
NEW TOTAL
= UZ*A*g(r) + UZ*A*k(SEWER) + e
where PZ is the fraction of land zoned for lot sizes greater than 25,000
square feet, and UZ is one minus PZ, the share unzoned.
The fraction of decade new construction which is single family
units and the fraction which is apartment units (five or more units in
structure) are therefore modelled as a function of the price of land,
zoning, and sewer availability. The share of the new construction which is
multi-family units (two to four units in structure) is the residual; that
is, total new construction less singles and apartment units.
Land price is proxied, as before, by percent of land vacant at
the beginning of the period. The 1960 percent vacant land is entered into
the equations as a set of seven dummy variables (V1-V7) , each for a range
of values of the variable. It is entered in this fashion rather than
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continuously because, as postulated earlier, land price is not a linear
function of percent vacant, and even if it were, we don't expect the shares
of new construction single or apartment to be linear functions of land
price.
These regressions were run using ordinary least squares. The results
were as follows (standard errors in parentheses below coefficients)
:
WFtJ TOTM
^
" '^^^ ^^ ~ -00278 UZ*SEWER + .392 UZ*V1 + .618 UZ*V2 + .700 UZ*V3
(.0425) (.00111) (.119) (.123) (.109)
+ .799 UZ*V4 + .828 UZ*V5 + .970 UZ*V6 + .768 UZ*V7 + e
(.110) (.0854) (.0881) (.0878)
R^ = .7921
Standard Error of the Regression = .157
=
.00276 A*UZ*SEWER + .518 A*UZ*V1 + .298 A*UZ*V2 + .145 A*UZ*V3
NEW TOTAL
( 00105) (.112) (.117) (.103)
+ .130 A*UZ*V4 + .0936 A*UZ*V5 + .0644 A*UZ*V6 + .192 A*UZ*V7 + e
(.104) (.0803) (.0815) (.0779)
R^ = .7770
Standard Error of the Regression = .149
The progression of coefficients across the categories is what we expect
(increasing for singles, decreasing for apartments) except for the last
category. In each case, the coefficient on V7 (= 1 if fraction vacant > .5)
is not significantly different in a statistical sense from that on V6.
These coefficients are displayed graphically in Figure 2.
SEWER enters both equations as expected, implying that for each ten
percentage points of sewer availability in a zone, an additional three
percent of new construction is apartments, not singles, ceteris paribus .
NEW APART
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A t-test shows that the coefficient on PZ in the SINGLE equation is not
statistically significantly different from unity, which is what the nodel
predicted. The use of the zoning variables multiplicatively (both UZ
2
and A) improves the overall fit (higher R , lower sum of squared residuals)
and the individual coefficients in comparison with exclusion of the
zoning variables or inclusion as a separate linear continuous variable.
C. Conversion Supply
The second major means of housing stock adjustment is the process
of changing existing housing units to provide a different quality or quantity
of services. Over ten percent of the 1960 Boston S.M.S.A. housing stock
(and almost 20 percent of the 1960 City of Boston stock) had been demolished,
lost through other means, or changed by conversion or merger by 1970.
Considering the size of the housing stock in comparison with new construction,
these data indicate that such processes have an important impact on aggregate
housing supply. Our focus in this model for both new construction and
conversion-demolition is on changes in the number of housing units and
their structure type (units in structure) . What we call the "conversion-
demolition process" includes a number of distinct activities by property-
owners: "converting" a structure by increasing or decreasing the number
of housing units it encloses; and withdrawing the units in a structure
from the housing stock, through conversion to nonresidential use, or through
demolition. Demolition may take place because a structure is worn out
or because other uses for the site are more profitable; thus it may be
done in order to create open area or to make possible the construction
of a new (residential or nonresidential) structure on the site. In the
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latter case, only half the process (the demolition) is considered "conversion-
demolition"; the replacement structure (if residential) is a part of new
construction.
In the discussion of residential new construction, the point was
emphasized that as an area develops and the price of land rises, the
lot size (or land/nonland factor input ratio) of newly built units declines.
Since units are durable, as development occurs, units of different density
exist side by side. The older units display factor proportions which
no longer reflect the least-cost technology, once factor prices have
changed (generally with higher relative prices of land). That is, these
units are not of the type that would be built in their place if all the
development occurred in the present; or, looking at the issue from the
other side, these units would be replaced with units which economized
more on land if they were to wear out and fall down.
Conversion supply is accomplished, as is new construction, by the
combination of land, labor, capital, and materials inputs. Conversion
supply differs from new construction in that certain of the inputs,
land and some of the capital, are already in place in a given quantity
and form. Converters do not deal in the market for land, thus they respond
to a set of signals different from those faced by new suppliers. Owners
(or potential purchasers of existing property) compare the operating costs
and revenues of the current use with the incronental capital costs (and
demolition costs) and operating costs and revenues of uses to which the
property could be converted (or replaced with after demolition) • Because
incremental costs are smaller for conversion than demolition-new construction,
less disequilibrium is required to elicit the former than the latter supply
response.
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In the aggregate (that is, adding up over the decisions by individual
suppliers) the most important determinant of conversion-demolition supply
activity in a zone is the stock and type of housing units available. In
addition, it is important how far "out of equilibrium" that stock is, how
much demand for housing in the area has risen since the units were put
in place. Increased demand, expressed per unit area, encourages more
intensive uses of the area, that is, the production of more housing units
on the given land. (Conversion will occur when output price times the
new q minus annual incremental capital and operating costs is greater than
output price times the old q.) Thus in a rough sense, we would expect
more conversion activity (whether adding or subtracting units) in old
units than new, because the old units are less well-adapted to current
demand conditions. In addition, worn-out units, whether old or not,
are most likely to be demolished, since current returns are not as high.
Demolition activity thus reflects the need for normal replacement as well
as radical conversion. "Radical" conversion, that is, demolition for
replacement with a very different kind of structure, is more costly than
building the structure on vacant land, and hence is undertaken only
when the current structure is very far out of equilibrium and when there
is very little vacant land (these two conditions occur together not
coincidentally but rather because of the way the land market operates)
.
In addition to the existing stock and its current appropriateness,
many of the same local conditions which affect new construction also affect
conversion-demolition activity. High housing unit vacancy rates are a
signal of excess supply in the market (and for the individual supplier
with a vacant unit mean that there is no current return to be foregone
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by changing the property use) . Price changes act in much the same way,
except that as a reflection of the rate of price change for both the origin
and destination types it may not indicate the direction of conversion.
Government programs such as urban renewal and public housing have direct
impacts through land-clearing demolition and various kinds of subsidies
to rehabilitation or alteration activity, and through these direct impacts
may also affect decisions made by competing private suppliers in the same
zone. Zoning, where it takes the form of minimtim lot sizes, presumably
inhibits the conversion of single unit structures into more than one unit,
although often such zoning is enacted to control future development of
open land rather than imposing restrictions on existing units.
The results of estimating conversion-demolition equations are shown
in Table 2. In each case, the dependent variable is the net decade
change in units of that structure type per acre not due to new construction.
The dependent variable and independent variables relating to housing stock
(old stocks, deteriorating stocks, public housing) are divided by total
acres to control for the effects of arbitrary differences in area on the
amount of housing supply activity taking place.
The very strong importance of existing stocks is well documented in
Table 2. In each equation, the deteriorating stock is highly associated
with demolitions. Old stock accounts for much of the conversion activity,
the general direction being to increase densities, although a small share
of multi-family units may be changing into singles. New construction of
housing in areas without much vacant land (measured by NEW TIGHT = NEW TOTAL/
VACANT ACRES, treated as endogenous) contributes significantly to demolitions
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Table 2
CONVERSION-DEMOLITION SUPPLY EQUATIONS
(Asympotic standard errors in parentheses)
N = 89
CONV
SINGLE
CONV
MULTI
CONV
APART
CONSTANT .0209
(.0673)
.0308
(.0773)
.0238
(.110)
APRICE
(endogenous)
.181
(.0893)
-.111
(.100)
-.179
(.145)
VAC RATE,-
oU
-.0211
(.0160)
-.0161
(.0176)
.0203
(.0223)
AVAC RATE
(endogenous)
.00760
(.0195)
-.0513
(.0223)
.0353
(.0274
OLD S INGLE.
„
oO
-.189
(.0417)
.153
(.0345)
.0530
(.0427)
OLD MULT I,
„
oO
.00997
(.0129)
.0784
(.0178)
.0211
(.0182)
OLD APART,^ .310
(.00935)
DETER SINGLE,-
oO
-1.25
(.149)
DETER MULTI,-
oO
-.977
(.112)
DETER APART,-
oO
-1.92
(.0533)
MLS ZONING -.000540
(.000527)
-.0000147
(.000567)
.000709
(.000689)
PUBLIC HOUSING .0130 '
(.156)
.995
(.139)
LEASED PUB HOU -.826
(.487)
-3.94
(.567)
NEW TIGHT
(endogenous)
-.000509
(.0000903)
-.000740
(.000129)
r2 .9183 .9523 .9874
F-statistic
(degrees of
freedom)
113.
(8.80)
156.
(10.78)
612.
(10,78)
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of singles and multis. NEW TIGHT is not included in the apartment equation
because apartments are less often torn down to make room for new units.
This is both because apartments are already more intensive uses of land
and because demolition costs are higher for such structures.
The aggregate data we have suggests that most (three-quarters)
of the changes in the single stock measured by CONV SINGLE are demolitions
(CONV SINGLE is negative for every city, town and district in the sample).
Thus is it not surprising to see a significantly positive sign on price
in the CONV SINGLE equation. Where returns are rising, existing uses are
not abandoned. Similarly, where vacancy rates are high, more demolitions
occur. In the other equations, the "CONV" activity is a mixture of con-
versions (in and out) and demolitions, and the price change coefficients are
not significantly different from zero.
Zoning appears insignificant in all the equations, suggesting
that zoning is more effective with regard to new construction. The
other government policy tool, public housing, has a strong impact on
conversion-demolition, especially of apartments. It appears that the
more conventional forms of public housing, in which subsidies are provided
for construction or rehabilitation, have a positive effect on the number
of apartment (and multi-family) units, but that the leased public housing
program discourages augmentation of the stock through conversion, or en-
courages demolitions. However, it should be noted that the statistical
methods used cannot distinguish between the effects of the public housing
programs and the housing conditions which make a jurisdiction adopt
the public housing approach to solving their housing problems.
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V. Summary
This has been a long paper. In concluding, we wish merely to note
the special features of our approach and the chief thrust of our findings.
Demand and supply relations for housing units
have been derived and estimated using simultaneous equation econometric
methods. The supply functions determine changes in different numbers
and types of housing structures in the different zones, the demand functions
determine the zonal distribution of the population partitioned by three
income groups. Through price and vacancy rate changes, supply and demand
jointly determine the location of households and housing structures.
The demand relations model the decadal change in the proportion of
each income group locating in each zone as a function of zonal attributes,
accommodation prices and vacancy rates. These zonal attributes can broadly
be described as structural attributes, social-environmental attributes,
public service and tax rate variables and accessibility attributes.
Our results suggest that different income groups have different relative
tastes for these attributes. Two supply modes are treated separately -
new construction and conversion/demolition. Decade changes in new units
in any zone are a function of expected revenue changes (as reflected in
price changes and vacancy rates) and expected costs, largely differential
availability and land costs, as reflected in initial vacant acres, and
minimum lot zoning. The composition of new construction in terms of
structure types is determined largely by land prices which indicate dif-
fering land-capital ratios. Decade changes in zonal units through conversion/
demolition are largely a function of the same expected revenue measures.
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and cost measures that reflect the number of existing structures of dif-
ferent type, age and condition in the zone which are available for inex-
pensive conversion or ripe for demolition.
Our econometric estimations, by 2SLS, generally gave results that
were encouraging. The overall fits were reasonable and the signs and
patterns of relative magnitude of coefficients across structure type and
supply mode on the supply side, and household type on the demand side are
generally consistent with a priori expectations. Several variables do
show puzzling results, and our present ongoing work is attempting to deal
with problems exposed in the first stage of our study reported here.
-49-
N
iS) ^%
APAi:^.!
AjQ^A^iir
e^.
Figure 1
.% 8-
1
Figure 2
-50-
SYMBOLIC NAME
LOW
MIDDLE
HIGH
SINGLE
MULTI
APART
TOTAL
NEW SINGLE
NEW MULTI
NEW APART
NEW TOTAL
CONV SINGLE
CONV MULTI
CONV APART
CONV TOTAL
Appendix
Variable List
VARIABLE
The # of family households earning less than
$7000 in 1970 dollars.
The //of family households earning between
$7000 and $15,000 in 1970 dollars.
The # of family households earning over
$15,000 in 1970 dollars.
// of single family housing units, divided
by total acres.
# of multi-family housing units, divided
by total acres.
# of apartment units, divided by total acres.
Total # of housing units.
The number of single units in existence "^
in 1970 which had been built since 1960.
The number of multi-family units in existence
in 1970 which had been built since 1960.
The number of apartment units in existence
in 1970 which had been built since 1960.
All units in existence in 1970 which had
been built since 1960.
The 1960 to 1970 change in stock of single
units due to conversions, retirements, and
demolitions, per acre.
The 1960 to 1970 change in stock of multi-
family units caused by conversions, retirements,
and demolitions, per acre.
The 1960 to 1970 change in stock of apartment
units caused by conversions, retirements,
and demolitions, per acre.
The change from I960 to 1970 in the total #
of housing units, which is not attributable
to new construction.
SYMBOLIC NAl-IE
OLD
LARGE
BATHROOMS
DETERIORATE
POP DEN
BLACK
CRIME
WELFARE
VACANT ACRES*
MLS ZONING
SEWER
PT RATIO
EFF TAX
JOB ACC
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Variable List
>
VARIABLE
The percent of 1960 units that were built
before 1930.
The percent of a zone's units which have 7 or
more rooms.
The percentage of a zone's units which have
greater than one bathroom.
The percentage of a zone's units which are
deteriorating.
Population ^ residential , vacant and recreational
acres.
The percent of a zone's population that is
nonwhite.
FBI comprehensive crime rate.
% of households on welfare.
The // of acres of land which are vacant.
The % of a zone's residential and vacant
land zoned for lot sizes larger than 25,000
square feet.
Sewer availability: the % of population
served by public sewers.
Pupils/ teacher high schools.
Effective property tax rate.
General road accessibility to employment.
89
JOB ACC-" = E
Yi
where
=1 ^ J K
C.,, = travel time from zone i to zone K
X = employment of income type (either
HIGH, MIDDLE, or LOW) in zone K
relative to S.M.S.A. total employ-
ment of that income type
RESIDENTIAL ACRES* The number of acres devoted to residential uses.
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Variable List
SYMBOLIC NAME
TOTAL ACRES*
HIGHWAY
VAC RATE
APRICE
OTHER ACRES*
OPEN
PZ
UZ
OLD SINGLE
OLD MULT
I
OLD APART
DETER SINGLE
DETER MULTI
VARIABLE
The number of acres of land in a zone =
total area minus acres of open water.
Highway availability index = (3 * No. limited
access superhighways + 2 * No. 4-lane high-
ways + 1 * No. 2-lane highways.) /total acres
in zone
Overall housing unit vacancy rate = (units
vacant for rent + vacant for sale) ^ occupied
and vacant units.
Housing price 1970 ^ housing price 1960.
Acres of land devoted to manufacturing.
Estimate of fraction of zone's area which
is vacant and not subject to minimum lot
size zoning = UZ*VACP.
The fraction of a zone's area zoned for
minimum lot sizes greater than 25,000
square feet = MLS ZONING ^ 100.
The fraction of a zone's area not zoned
for minimum lot sizes greater than 25,000
square feet = 1 - PZ.
A zero-one dummy; A = when town's zoning
code prohibits apartments.
An estimate of the number of single units
more than 30 years old, per acre = SINGLE*0LD.
An estimate of the number of multi-family
units in structures more than 30 years
old, per acre = MULTI*0LD.
An estimate of the number of apartment
units in structures more than 30 years old,
per acre = APART*0LD.
An estimate of the number of single family
units which are deteriorating, per acre =
SINGLE*DETERIORATE
.
An estimate of the number of multi-family
units which are deteriorating, per acre =
MULTI*DETERIORATE
.
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Variable List
SYMBOLIC NAME
DETER APART
PUBLIC HOUSING
LEASED PUB HOU
NEW TIGHT
VACP
VARIABLE
An estimate of the number of apartment
units which are deteriorating, per acre =
APART*DETERIORATE
.
The number of "conventional" and "turnkey"
(federal) public housing units in a zone in
1974, per acre.
The number of units of federally-sponsored
leased public housing in a zone in 1974,
per acre.
The number of new housing units built during
the decade per acre of vacant land initially
available = NEW TOTAL v VACANT ACRES. This
measures the likelihood of demolition activity
as a means of making land available to new
construction.
Fraction of zone's land which is vacant =
VACANT ACRES t TOTAL ACRES.
The seven vacant land percent dummy variables are defined as follows:
VI = 1 if VACP < ,05, otherwise
V2 = 1 if .05 < VACP < .10, otherwise
V3 = 1 if .10 < VACP < .20, otherwise
V4 = 1 if .20 < VACP < .30, otherwise
V5 = 1 if .30 < VACP < .40, otherwise ,
V6 = 1 if .40 < VACP < .50, otherwise
V7 = 1 if .50 < VACP, otherwise.
* The 1960 acreage data is derived from a 1963 land use survey; the
1970 acreage data is derived from a 1972 land use survey.
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